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NUREMBERG AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE
Henry T. King, Jr.
The Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western 
Reserve University sponsored a symposium, “The International Criminal 
Court and the Crime of Aggression,” on September 26, 2008. The purpose 
of the conference was to assist the ICC Assembly of State Parties’ Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression create a workable definition of 
aggression and the conditions under which the Court could exercise its ju-
risdiction over it. This transcript contains the remarks of Henry T. King, 
who delivered the opening address at the symposium.  
TRANSCRIPT
The international community has long sought to define “aggres-
sion” in a way that would serve as an effective tool in sustaining peace. I 
think that for this conference, I could serve you best by reviewing the origin 
of the Nuremberg aggressive-war charge—a crime against peace,1 as de-
fined by the victorious powers in the London Charter of August 8, 1945—
and tracing the role the charge played through the twelve subsequent pro-
ceedings at Nuremberg.2 By evaluating the checkered success of the aggres-
sion charge, I hope to provide context for the present effort to define ag-
gression. Context will be vital to drafting a definition that will be both ef-
fective and acceptable to seven-eighths of the 106 or so nations of the go-
verning assembly of states that have ratified the Rome Statute of July 1998.3
One of the revolutionary aspects of Nuremberg was that it held in-
dividuals responsible for the criminal acts they committed in the name of 
their country. Aggressive war was, up until then, an “act of state” that did 
not lead to individual liability. The new approach was based largely on the 
work of William C. Chanler, a law partner of the Secretary of War, Henry 
 Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
1 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.
2 See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (2007) 
(detailing the twelve subsequent proceedings). 
3 Rome statute of the International Criminal Court art. 121 and List of Signatories, July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.iccopi.int/library/about/officialjournal/ 
Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. 
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L. Stimson, who succeeded in getting it adopted as U.S. Policy.4 Chanler 
was among the first to argue that there should be individual liability for en-
gaging in crimes against peace.5
The basis of Chanler’s argument that aggression should be an inter-
national crime was the Kellogg Briand Peace Act of 1928,6 which outlawed 
war as an instrument of national policy. The Act was ratified by over sixty 
nations, including Germany.7 Chanler’s contribution was to criminalize 
aggression and to punish individuals for starting aggressive war.8 His ap-
proach was intended to correct the situation where individuals like Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, who helped launch World War I, would go scot-free after the 
war. 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt adopted Chandler’s idea on 
January 3, 1945,9 and thereafter it became a part of American policy to in-
clude it in war crimes proposals.10 Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and on 
the following day Justice Robert Jackson gave a speech before the Ameri-
can Society of International Law in which he argued for the prosecution of 
Nazi war criminals and emphasized the importance of a fair trial.11
At the suggestion of Samuel Rosenman, who had handled issues re-
lated to war crimes tribunals on behalf of President Franklin Roosevelt, 
President Truman appointed Robert Jackson to negotiate arrangements for 
the war-crimes trials and to represent the United States at the trials them-
selves.12 Jackson strongly advocated for an international tribunal. His views 
sometimes ran counter to those of the other three countries participating in 
the war crimes project.13 Usually he prevailed. Jackson was dynamic and 
eloquent, and without him there might never have been any Nuremberg 
trials at all. 
The four victorious, major powers met in London in the summer of 
1945 to develop a charter governing the future International Military Tri-
bunal (IMT) at Nuremberg.14 In preparing the United States’ position, Jus-
4 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Tribute to Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson, 16 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 365, 366 (2004) 
5 See Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme…Crime” and Its Origins: The Lost Legislative 
History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324, 2324 (2002). 
6 Id. at 2355. 
7 Id. at 2334. 
8 Id. at 2324. 
9 See id. at 2363. 
10 Id.
11 See id. at 2365–66. 
12 See Ferencz, supra note 4, at 366. 
13 Id.
14 Telford Taylor Panel: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 453, 476–477 (1995).  
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tice Jackson included charges not only of “crimes against peace,” but also of 
“conspiracy to wage aggressive war.”15 The concept of conspiracy as an 
independent crime was not part of the Napoleonic Civil Code followed by 
the continental states,16 so France and the U.S.S.R. initially opposed includ-
ing conspiracy as an independent crime.17 This created rough going for 
Jackson, but he eventually prevailed.18
In approaching Nuremberg, the Soviet representatives wanted the 
charges of aggressive war limited to what the Nazis did, with no generic 
application.19 The Russians, I believe, felt that generic charges could extend 
to cover some of their own acts. At the same time, the French indicated that 
they wanted to limit the charges to violations of an established treaty. 
Jackson’s definition of crimes against peace, which was included in 
the London Charter, read as follows: “Planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in any common plan or conspira-
cy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.20
At Nuremberg, I worked on the case against the German general 
staff and high command. In fact, I wrote part of the final brief against the 
general staff and high command. I remember very clearly the evidence that 
we had against some members of this group on the issue of aggression. The 
evidence came from Hitler’s own files, prepared by his adjutants.  
For example, at a meeting with his top commanders on November 
5, 1937, Hitler said the following: “The history of all times—Roman Em-
pire, British Empire—has proved that every space expansion can only be 
effected by breaking resistance and taking risks.” He continued “the ques-
tion for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at 
the lowest cost. . . . The German question can only be solved by force and 
this is never without risk.”21
Later, on May 23, 1939, while meeting with his military command-
ers in the Reich Chancellery, Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland 
at the first suitable opportunity. He said: “There will be war. Our task is to 
isolate Poland.”22
15 Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nuremberg’s Architect and Advocate, 68 
ALBANY L. REV. 55, 57 (2004). 
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Bush, supra note 5, at 2369. 
21 XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 431 (1948). 
22 Id. at 441–42.  
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On August 22, he again met with his top commanders and reiterated 
his decision to make war on Poland. He told them: “Now, Poland is in the 
position in which I wanted her . . . I am only afraid that at the last moment 
some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation.”23
“I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war—never mind 
whether it be plausible or not. . . . The start will be ordered probably by 
Saturday morning.”24
A number of world leaders appealed to Hitler to not force war with 
Poland.25 But their appeals fell on deaf ears, and on August 31, Hitler issued 
his final directive for the attack on Poland. The attack was launched on the 
morning of September 1, 1939. It marked the start of World War II.26
There were a number of the defendants at Nuremberg who attended 
these meetings with Hitler and many were charged by the IMT with aggres-
sion and conspiracy to commit aggression.27
The Nuremberg judges took a conservative view of the conspiracy 
charge. The judgments of the IMT reflected this conservative stance.28 The 
Tribunal acquitted fourteen of the twenty-two defendants charged with con-
spiracy.29 But, it convicted twelve of the sixteen defendants charged with 
crimes against peace, and acquitted only four.30
The problem with the judgment of the IMT in its handling of the 
aggression charge and the conspiracy-to-commit-aggression charge is that it 
does not contain significant generic language dealing with the concept of 
aggression. The IMT came down hard against aggression, saying it is “the 
supreme international crime,” which included, in essence, all other war 
crimes; but the Tribunal limited its discussion to the factual situations in-
volving particular individuals.31 The Tribunal provided no sweeping discus-
sion on aggression, per se, or what other perquisites (e.g., rank) there are for 
convicting particular individuals of aggression. In other words, the IMT 
judgment left open the question of how involved in the policy of aggression 
an individual would have to be in order to be convicted. Specifically, the 
23 Id. at 442–43. 
24 Id. at 443 (that Saturday was August 26). 
25 Id. at 444.  
26 Id. at 444–45. 
27 Id. at 441. 
28 See id. at 522. 
29 See TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE 
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 226 (1949). 
30 John F. Murphy, Crimes Against Peace at the Nuremberg Trial, in THE NUREMBERG 
TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 152 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kurdiavtsev eds., 
1990).
31 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 21, at 427. 
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Tribunal never resolved whether an individual must have been on a policy 
level where he could have influenced policy but failed to do so. 
In essence, the IMT held in its judgment that aggressive war was 
the ultimate international crime, but did not elucidate the scope of the ag-
gressive-war charge, or distinguish its application to lower-ranking govern-
ment officials and non-government actors, from those tried at Nuremberg. 
Telford Taylor, my superior at Nuremberg, said that certain ques-
tions about crimes against peace remained unanswered after Nuremberg.32
How to assess the accused individual’s relation to the unlawful enterprise? 
What degree of knowledge of the plans or of the aggressive character of the 
war must the accused individual have possessed? What type of action must 
he have taken? How important a position must he have occupied? How in-
fluential in determining national policy must he have been? At what stage of 
the criminal enterprise must he have become involved? And, is it sufficient 
that he merely waged aggressive war after its inception if he had no role in 
its planning or initiation? 
Criticism of the decision has been based upon the lack of any au-
thoritative definition of aggressive war. The question which proved most 
troublesome was how to assess the guilt of the accused individuals. 
The principles laid down in the judgment of the IMT were endorsed 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in late 1946.33 The land-
mark IMT case was followed by twelve subsequent proceedings at Nurem-
berg.34 Although the aggressive-war charge was raised in a number of these 
proceedings, it struck out in all but one of them. Control Council Law 
Number Ten, enacted by the four powers in December, 1945, governed the 
subsequent Nuremberg proceedings.35 The definition of crimes against 
peace was broadened to include not only aggressive war, but also “inva-
sions” (e.g., Austria and Czechoslovakia).36
There were twelve subsequent proceedings at Nuremberg. In each 
of the industrialists’ trials crimes against peace was charged, but there was 
not one finding of guilt.37 It was a different story in the ministries case, 
which was the last of the Nuremberg subsequent proceedings. In the minis-
tries case, five of the defendants were convicted of crimes against peace—
Von Weizsacker, Woermann and Keppler of the Foreign Office, Lammers, 
32 TELFORD TAYLOR, supra note 29 at 221–22.  
33 Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Holocaust and the Nuremberg Trials, UN CHRONICLE 
ONLINE EDITION, 2005, http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2005/issue4/0405p03.html.  
34 DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 47.  
35 See AUGUST VON KNIERIEM, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 513-17 (Elizabeth D. Schmitt 
trans., 1959). 
36 See id. at 513–14. 
37 TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 196–97. 
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Chief of Hitler’s Reich Chancellery, and Koerner, Goring’s alter ego in the 
four year plan.38 These were the first convictions for the commission of 
crimes against peace that were obtained at Nuremberg since the IMT judg-
ment, and to quote General Telford Taylor, the chief prosecutor, “in a vastly 
altered international climate.”39 This quote is from Taylor’s final report to 
the Secretary of War. 
Judgment in the Ministries case was rendered between April 11 and 
April 13, 1949.40 In a supplementary decision upon motion in December 
1949, Judge McCoy inexplicably reduced the sentences of Von Weizscack-
er and Woermann from seven years to five.41 But, that same month, the 
crimes-against-peace convictions of Keppler, Lammers, and Koerner were 
reaffirmed. 
The Ministries judgment also broke new ground by holding that the 
“invasions” of Austria in February 1939 and of post-Munich Czechlosova-
kia in March 1939, each of which was a bloodless conquests—a victory 
achieved by an overwhelming display of military might without resort to a 
“shooting war”—were also wholly aggressive in character and were, accor-
dingly, crimes against peace.42
In the Tokyo trials, which followed Nuremberg, General MacAr-
thur, the U.S. commander, appointed judges from a number of countries to 
pass judgment on the evidence against the Japanese war criminals.43 A 
number of the defendants were found guilty of crimes against peace and 
punished by hanging for the commission of the crimes.44
After Nuremberg and Tokyo, the Cold War ensued, and there was 
no longer any punishment in the courts for aggression.45 The special war-
crimes tribunals, which were established by the United Nations after the end 
of the Cold War, were designed to try crimes against humanity and geno-
cide. But the charge of aggressive war was never raised in those courts.46
When plans for the International Criminal Court were being devel-
oped in 1998, three former Nuremberg prosecutors, including Ben Ferencz 
38 Id. at 214–15. 
39 Id. at 196–97. 
40 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia, Subsequent 
Nuremberg Proceedings, Case #11, the Ministries Case, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.p 
hp?lang=en& ModuleId=10007082 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).  
41 Jonathan Friedman, Law and Politics in the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 1946-1949,
in ATROCITIES ON TRAIL 75, 89 (Patricia Heberer & Jurgen Matthaus eds., 2008). 
42 TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 222–23. 
43 See DRUMBL, supra note 2, at 49. 
44 See id.
45 See Antonio Cassese, On Some Problematical Aspects of the Crime of Aggression, 20 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 841, 844 (2007). 
46 Id. at 842. 
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and me, worked very hard toward naming aggression as a crime in the 
ICC’s founding document, the Rome Statute.47 Although aggression was 
included, it was not defined in the statute, and it was not until later that a 
working group of the assembly of states, whose nation members have rati-
fied the Rome Statute and have oversight over the International Criminal 
Court, began trying to formulate a suitable definition that could be ratified 
by seven-eighths of the membership of the assembly of the states.48 That 
project will hopefully be completed by 2010,49 and I think the time is ripe 
for a comprehensive definition of aggression to be included in the amended 
Rome Statute. 
The charge of aggressive war had an uneven early history. It was an 
American creation, largely suggested by William C. Chanler, and it was 
endorsed by President Roosevelt as early as 1945. But, although it became 
an integral part of the Nuremberg tapestry, the IMT never specified what 
generic ingredients were necessary for a finding of aggression. Yet a consi-
derable number of the defendants in the IMT and Ministries Cases were 
found guilty of aggressive war, and that, in itself, was important. Unfortu-
nately, the holdings in those cases were limited to the guilt or innocence of 
the particular defendants, so the theory behind the aggressive war charge 
was never elucidated. Excepting the Ministries case, there were no crimes-
against-peace convictions in the subsequent proceedings. Additional cases 
alleging crimes against peace, brought against industrialists and members of 
the military, were always dismissed, both at the time and throughout the 
Cold War. 
We now have an opportunity to build a better world for the future 
by agreeing on a definition of aggression that can be used by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. This is a golden moment in history, and I hope that 
we will take full advantage of it by securing a mutually acceptable defini-
tion which can be adopted for the world of states—some 106—that have 
ratified the Rome Statute. 
We can no longer afford the existence of aggressive war. It is too 
costly, both in terms of its toll in human lives and its physically destructive 
effects on our planet.  
The world waits—the time is late—this is why our conference to-
day is crucial. 
47 See, e.g., Benjamin B. Ferencz, Can Aggression be Deterred by Law?, 11 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 341, 342 (1999). 
48 See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, CIC BACKGROUND PAPER ON 
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 1 (2007) http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Aggression_Backgr 
ound_Paper_ ASP5ResumedSession_23Jan07.pdf 
49 See id. at 6. 
